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Much controversy exists regarding the role of the hippocampus in retrieval. The two dom-
inant and competing accounts have been the Standard Model of Systems Consolidation
(SMSC) and Multiple Trace Theory (MTT), which specifically make opposing predictions as
to the necessity of the hippocampus for retrieval of remote memories. Under SMSC, mem-
ories eventually become independent of the hippocampus as they become more reliant
on cortical connectivity, and thus the hippocampus is not required for retrieval of remote
memories, only recent ones. MTT on the other hand claims that the hippocampus is always
required no matter the age of the memory. We argue that this dissociation may be too sim-
plistic, and a continuum model may be better suited to address the role of the hippocampus
in retrieval of remote memories. Such a model is presented here with the main function
of the hippocampus during retrieval being “recontextualization,” or the reconstruction of
memory using overlapping traces. As memories get older, they are decontextualized due to
competition among partially overlapping traces and become more semantic and reliant on
neocortical storage. In this framework dubbed the CompetitiveTraceTheory (CTT), consol-
idation events that lead to the strengthening of memories enhance conceptual knowledge
(semantic memory) at the expense of contextual details (episodic memory). As a result,
remote memories are more likely to have a stronger semantic representation. At the same
time, remote memories are also more likely to include illusory details. The CTT is a novel
candidate model that may provide some resolution to the memory consolidation debate.
Keywords: systems consolidation, multiple trace theory, pattern separation, pattern completion, interference,
episodic memory, semantic memory, competition
INTRODUCTION
Much evidence points to the significant role of the hippocam-
pus in the encoding of new declarative memories (Milner et al.,
1998; Squire, 2009). This small region of the brain possesses a
unique architecture that allows it to rapidly encode experiences
while minimizing interference. Virtually every model of learning
ascribes this important function to the hippocampus, especially in
the context of declarative memory (in contrast to habit or other
procedural learning). However, the role of the hippocampus in
retrieval (especially episodic retrieval) is still subject to debate.
While there is certainly a neural architecture in the hippocampus
capable of such contextual retrieval, for example, a recurrent col-
lateral network in CA3 capable of autoassociation (Marr, 1971),
as well as an abundance of evidence across species demonstrating
the involvement of the hippocampus in contextual retrieval tasks
(Eldridge et al., 2000; Ryan et al., 2001; Yonelinas et al., 2002, 2005;
Holdstock et al., 2004; Daselaar et al., 2006; Diana et al., 2007;
Wiltgen et al., 2010; Goshen et al., 2011) there is still an active
debate about whether the hippocampus is required for retrieval of
remote episodic memories.
SYSTEMS CONSOLIDATION VS. MULTIPLE TRACE THEORY
At present, two major theories make predictions relevant to this
debate. The first is the Standard Model of Systems Consolidation
(SMSC: Squire and Alvarez, 1995), a widely influential view in the
field. The SMSC holds that the initial memory trace is encoded
both in the hippocampus and in the cortex, though the cortex
is itself unable to initially support the memory. Rather, the hip-
pocampus is critical in early encoding stages. As a function of
time, replay, and retrieval, the hippocampus “teaches” the cortex
the memory trace such that the associative connectivity between
the individual elements of the cortical memory increase in strength
over time. After the memory has been consolidated, the hippocam-
pus is no longer required for retrieval. This is based on the large
body of evidence that synapses change much more rapidly and
dynamically in the hippocampus than they do in cortex (Fran-
kland and Bontempi, 2005). These ideas were first proposed by
Marr (1971) and further elaborated by the widely influential Com-
plementary Learning Systems (CLS) model of McClelland et al.
(1995), which emphasizes the role of hippocampal-neocortical
interactions in the formation and consolidation of memory. Thus,
the SMSC predicts that the hippocampus is not required for the
retrieval of remote memories, only recent ones that have not yet
been fully consolidated.
The competing theory, known as Multiple Trace Theory
(MTT), was proposed by Nadel and Moscovitch (1997) as an
alternative to the standard model. Unlike the SMSC, MTT pro-
posed that the hippocampus has an important role in the retrieval
of all episodic memories, including remote ones. Similar to
the SMSC, MTT also proposed that memories are encoded in
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hippocampal-neocortical networks, but that each reactivation
resulted in a different trace in the hippocampus. Hippocampal-
bound traces are presumed to be contextual and rich in spatial
and temporal details, while cortical-bound traces are presumed
to be semantic and largely context-free. Thus, retrieval of remote
semantic memories does not require the hippocampus, however,
retrieval of remote episodic memories always does, irrespective of
the age of the memory.
Thus, at the heart of the debate is the role of the hippocam-
pus in the retrieval of remote episodic memories. In fact, that has
been the only reliably testable prediction for either theory thus
far, although as discussed below, support for even this single pre-
diction proved tenuous at best. First, it is important to recognize
that both models were proposed to explain amnesia data from
human and animal studies, and namely the nature of the retro-
grade amnesia (RA) gradient observed. While numerous studies
have observed that the RA gradient was temporally graded, in
many cases, the RA gradient was flat, and in some cases the degree
of RA gradient depended on the size of the lesion (reviewed in
Frankland and Bontempi, 2005). In addition to lesion data, data
from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has been
brought to bear on this debate. For example, Nadel and Moscov-
itch (1997) have shown that medial temporal fMRI activity was
equally predictive of recent and remote memory retrieval. How-
ever, a major criticism of these studies is that the hippocampus
is involved in incidental and automatic encoding during retrieval
tasks, which may obscure retrieval-related activity (Buckner et al.,
2001; Haist et al., 2001; Stark and Okado, 2003). A recent survey
of the evidence based on amnesia studies in rodents with partial
and full hippocampal damage provides overwhelming support for
flat RA gradients, which argues against the SMSC (cf. Sutherland
et al., 2010). Importantly, however, these data also argue against
one prediction of MTT, which is that partial hippocampal dam-
age will lead to a temporal RA gradient. Thus, neither model can
adequately account for lesion data in animals.
Two particularly compelling pieces of data are worth discussing
here to further illustrate the complexity of this debate. Scoville and
Milner (1957) initially reported that patient H. M. had a case of
temporally graded RA. In fact, much of the subsequent work on RA
was based on this initial finding. Much later, however, as it became
clearer that neuropsychological testing procedures were not as
refined in that era and that episodic memory could not have been
tested fully. Corkin (2002) later asserted that “H. M. was unable to
supply an episodic memory of his mother or his father – he could
not narrate even one event that occurred at a specific time and
place.” She surmised that many of the remote memories H. M. was
able to retrieve were indeed “semanticized.” In contrast, patient E.
P., another case of profound amnesia studied by Squire and col-
leagues, was able to demonstrate highly detailed spatial remote
memories (Stefanacci et al., 2000), arguing against the notion of a
flat episodic RA gradient. This is further complicated by the incon-
sistency of results across studies of different amnesic patients with
partial medial temporal lobe or hippocampal damage, and the lack
of detailed neuroanatomical quantification in many cases. Thus,
evidence from amnesia as to the RA gradient is not entirely conclu-
sive, and provides only partial and sometimes conflicting support
for either of the major theories discussed above.
A recent study by Goshen et al. (2011) used optogenetic tech-
niques to demonstrate that hippocampal CA1 neuron activation
was necessary for the retrieval of several week old (i.e., remote)
memories, providing evidence against the SMSC. However, they
also showed that longer inhibition (matching the timescale of the
more typical pharmacological inhibition) abolished this depen-
dence on the hippocampus, weakening the account provided by
MTT. While Goshen and colleagues suggested that there is com-
pensation via other structures such as the anterior cingulate cortex,
the data can be taken to suggest both MTT and SMSC may both be
at work and that perhaps each offers elements of the true nature
of memory consolidation. This recent work motivates and under-
scores the value of alternate proposals that attempt to harmonize
between the two models.
THE HIPPOCAMPUS AS AN INDEX
Both accounts discussed above rely to an extent on the notion
of hippocampal indexing. These ideas were initially presented by
Teyler and DiScenna (1985), and were formally developed into
the hippocampal memory indexing theory (Teyler and DiScenna,
1986). This theory has served as a critical component of our cur-
rent understanding of hippocampal computations, and as such, it
warrants discussion here (for review, see Teyler and Rudy, 2007).
The central aim of the hippocampal memory indexing theory
is to explain the nature of hippocampal involvement in encoding
and retrieving memory traces. Particularly, this was among the
first attempts at explaining interactions between the hippocampus
and neocortex during episodic memory computations. Though
evidence had accumulated to underscore the importance of the
hippocampus in many memory processes, two important realiza-
tions came to light. First, there appeared to be multiple neural
networks capable of supporting memory (Sherry and Schacter,
1987). Second, the neocortex itself was found to be sufficient to
support some aspects of memory (Squire et al., 1984). Tulving and
Markowitsch (1998) went on to propose that episodic memory –
that is, memory rich in associated contextual details – is especially
dependent on the hippocampus. Indexing theory describes the
involvement and ultimate fate of these contextual details.
According to this theory, when a memory trace is encoded,
inputs from cortical sensory regions activate a relatively small
population of hippocampal synapses. The hippocampus in turn
activates a network of neocortical regions, and as the memory is
consolidated, the connections between the hippocampus and neo-
cortex are strengthened. Laying down hippocampal-neocortical
connections in this manner creates a physical instantiation of the
memory trace. Importantly, the hippocampus here plays a pivotal
role in memory retrieval. Activation of a small subset of neocor-
tical regions, part of a larger pattern comprising a consolidated
memory trace, can signal the hippocampus to re-instantiate the
full pattern despite partial or degraded input. In short, this pro-
vides an account for how certain aspects or contextual details of
an event can lead to recall of other related details.
It deserves further emphasis that under this interpretation, the
hippocampus does not store details about an event per se, but as
the name of the theory implies, rather acts as an index. That is,
as was described in Teyler and DiScenna’s theory, the hippocam-
pus is proposed to serve in coupling the activity of neocortical
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regions such that patterns of activity can induce recall of a given
memory trace. To make this proposition as clear as possible, let
us consider another description. If information is stored across
the neocortex, we might imagine it as a library. Memories, much
like library books, are often added, removed, or replaced. When
reconstructing an experience, one may need to access information
residing in different wings of the library. This is where the hip-
pocampus, our trusty librarian, comes in. While it has not stored
the wealth of knowledge contained in the library in a way that it
can readily reproduce, it can point to the correct locations where
this knowledge can be retrieved.
COMPETITIVE TRACE THEORY
We propose an alternative to the current theories of recent and
remote memory that combines elements of SMSC and MTT
largely within the framework of indexing theory. The account,
which we will refer to as the competitive trace theory (CTT), is an
integrated theory that attempts to explain phenomenological dis-
tinctions such as episodic vs. semantic, using neurocomputational
proposals based on interference and associations.
CONSOLIDATION AND DECONTEXTUALIZATION
First, we will start with some operational definitions. The words
“episodic” and “semantic” have been used abundantly in the mem-
ory literature to refer to memories that are rich in contextual detail
and memories that are devoid of such details, respectively. How-
ever, there is an additional important distinction that should be
considered here. That is the accuracy of such memory, which is
often uncorrelated with the success of recollection (Gallo et al.,
2001; Roediger et al., 2004; Kensinger and Schacter, 2007; Stahl and
Klauer, 2008; Kim and Yassa, 2013). Thus, in the CTT framework,
the word “episodic” will only be used to describe the phenomeno-
logical experience of contextual recollection and not in reference
to the accuracy of the memory. Inherent in this assignment is
the strong claim that these labels (“recollection” and “episodic”)
are only helpful insofar as they describe the experience and not
describe the memory representation itself, which is far more
dynamic and often contains illusory details.
The word “semantic,” on the other hand, will be used to refer to
the accurate knowledge that builds up over time and with much
repetition. The use of these terms will become more defined as we
describe the central tenets of the model, and we will maintain that
their use is only helpful in relative terms and not absolutes (i.e.,
one memory can be more episodic than another, but should not be
labeled as “episodic” absent a frame of reference). For now, it is
important to bear in mind three crucial assumptions of CTT: (1)
memories are most episodic and veridical at the moment they are
first encoded, (2) with every subsequent reactivation, the mem-
ory can become less episodic, and accurate details can be replaced
with illusory details, and (3) central features of experiences become
simultaneously consolidated and decontextualized (lose associated
details) over time.
How does this occur? We suggest that when a memory is reac-
tivated by an internal or external cue, the hippocampus acts to
re-instantiate the neural signature of the original memory trace.
In doing so, the hippocampus effectively recombines the elements
of the original memory trace. Critically, the central features of
that memory trace are reactivated. However, unlike prior theo-
ries of episodic memory retrieval, we propose that this process
potentially adds or subtracts individual contextual features. Given
the reactivation of the central features of the memory trace, the
new memory significantly overlaps with the original. However,
some of the features are non-overlapping, which leads to a slightly
altered version of the memory. This altered memory is now capa-
ble of being stored as a new memory trace and undergoes the
same storage process as the original memory. This in some ways
is reminiscent of MTT, but with several important distinctions.
According to our proposal, these memories are not stored in par-
allel, but rather compete for representation in the neocortex. Also,
MTT hypothesizes that the memory traces themselves are stored
in the hippocampus and not in the neocortex (this is the logic
behind the“larger lesions knock out older memories”effect (Nadel
and Moscovitch, 1998). Neocortical traces, according to MTT,
are overlapping only insofar as the encoding and retrieval con-
texts are overlapping, which allows for contextual retrieval driven
by hippocampal or neocortical traces. CTT, on the other hand,
hypothesizes that the hippocampus itself is not the site of trace
storage but rather it links the individual components of a neocor-
tical memory together such that it can be retrieved later by the
hippocampus or by the neocortex directly. Furthermore, neocor-
tical traces themselves become devoid of context with increasing
reactivations.
Two distinct phenomena can occur here: consolidation and
decontextualization. First, overlapping features in the memories
should not compete for representation and thus are strengthened
(i.e., consolidated) in a Hebbian fashion. As a result of repeated
activations, these overlapping features have a higher likelihood of
being retrieved with high fidelity. The increase in associative con-
nectivity over time allows these personal semantic components
of the memory to become hippocampus-independent. That is,
the overlapping neocortical components of such a memory trace
have become strengthened to the extent that the hippocampus
is no longer necessary to couple their activity. Second, the non-
overlapping features should compete with one another resulting
in mutual inhibition in an anti-Hebbian fashion, and a reduced
likelihood of any of such features being retrieved. In other words,
memories become decontextualized.
It follows from the above that retrieval of remote memories
appears episodic and contextual because of hippocampal recon-
struction and re-encoding, rather than a reactivation of a veridical
representation. Without the presence of the hippocampus dur-
ing retrieval (as in amnesia), the only retrievable memory is
the high fidelity semantic representation in the neocortex (see
Figure 1). These highly semanticized memories, having been con-
solidated and reconsolidated, are likely to feature a core set of
important facts but little contextual depth. Thus, CTT can be
viewed as a harmonization of SMSC and MTT in which con-
solidation and hippocampal independence occurs for semantic
components of experiences via a multiple trace mechanism, pro-
vided that the non-overlapping portions of these traces compete
for representation.
The CTT model asserts that recent episodic memories and
remote episodic memories, although they share phenomenolog-
ical features such as the sense of recollection or mental time
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FIGURE 1 | Hippocampal competitive trace theory. Every time a memory
is reactivated, the hippocampus encodes a partially overlapping trace that
serves to compete with other similar traces from other reactivations in the
neocortex. In the hippocampus, traces are non-overlapping due to pattern
separation. In the neocortex, the overlapping features are strengthened (i.e.,
consolidated) while the non-overlapping features become decontextualized.
During recent memory reactivation, an intact hippocampus is able to
recontextualizes the memory, storing an additional trace. In amnesia, the
recent memory cannot be retrieved in the absence of the hippocampus, since
no features have yet been consolidated. During remote memory reactivation,
an intact hippocampus continues to recontextualizes the memory, however, a
strong consolidated semantic memory is in place due to a number of prior
reactivations. In amnesia, the remote memory can be retrieved at least in part
based on the semantic memory. Absent the hippocampus,
recontextualization can no longer occur and additionally, the retrieval
experience may be less contextual than that of an intact subject.
travel (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997), possess underlying rep-
resentations that could not be more different. A recent memory
has no semantic components as those take time and repeated
instances of remembering to build, but it is rich in accurate con-
textual detail. A remote memory, on the other hand, has a strong
semantic component as a result of repeated retrieval events, but
also contains degraded contextual information, or reconstructed
contextual details that are often inaccurate.
Given these assumptions, we can redefine systems consoli-
dation as the selective strengthening of the core content of the
memory in neocortical circuits via hippocampal-neocortical inter-
actions, coupled with a selective weakening of irrelevant and highly
variable contextual details associated with each reactivation of the
memory. It is important to note that the second condition of con-
solidation is most directly observable in hippocampal amnesia as
the presence of the hippocampus in the intact brain gives the illu-
sion of intact contextual detail, while in fact this experience is the
direct result of mnemonic reconstruction and retrieval of illusory
contextual details (Figure 1).
This raises the question of why the hippocampus continues to
manufacture these illusory recollections, while a perfectly intact
semantic memory is accessible in the neocortex. There are sev-
eral potential answers. First, it is likely that contextual recollection,
despite its inaccuracy, facilitates social interactions, and the sharing
of experiences for the purpose of social bond formation. Second,
reconstructing such details, which become influenced by cultural
and other personal biases, may serve the important adaptive role of
creating narratives that can influence others’behavior. Imagine, for
example, how compelling reading someone’s autobiography can
be. Of course, another alternative is that there is no evolutionary
advantage to recollection aside from facilitating the competition
that is used to abstract memories so that massive amounts of infor-
mation can be stored. In this sense, it may better facilitate learning
and future adaptive behavior to incorporate illusory details into a
memory than to simply forego details altogether, and the recollec-
tive experience may be nothing more than an epiphenomenon of
an otherwise adaptive system.
THE RECONTEXTUALIZATION CONTINUUM
Figure 2 illustrates the episodic-semantic memory continuum
(purely based on the retrieval experience, not taking into consider-
ation the accuracy of memory). Given the slow cortical dynamics
responsible for consolidation, this relationship is best represented
as a continuum of decontextualization/recontextualization. In
other words, the axis of this continuum is the degree of contextual
detail (a function of reactivation events), which can be formally
quantified. The hippocampus, at the very left of the contin-
uum, is a context-encoding, associative device that simultaneously
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FIGURE 2 |The recontextualization continuum. Memories are most rich
in episodic context the moment they are first encoded. With every
subsequent reactivation (whether it’s internally or externally cued), the
memory becomes less episodic and more semantic (i.e., decontextualized).
Every time a memory is retrieved, however, it can be recontextualized or
re-encoded as a new trace with some overlapping features and some new
ones. This means memories recalled from the distant past could either be
decontextualized and accurate or recontextualized and inaccurate. Of
course, neither accuracy or contextualization is a categorical assignment for
the memory, but rather each memory can be described in terms of the
accuracy of its details and the degree to which they are contextual (i.e.,
episodic).
strengthens some components of the memory and distorts others.
The neocortex, at the very right of the continuum, is the final stor-
age site of semantic memories that have been consolidated using
slow cortical dynamics and trace interference over time. At the
neocortical stage, recurrent and overlapping details have become
relatively crystallized as the memory trace has been reconsolidated,
but non-overlapping details are more transient and may be unique
to a given recollective experience. That is, retrieval at any point in
time results in a new trace that is stored as a slightly alternate ver-
sion of the original memory. Retrieval at different points in this
continuum is shown using examples. Altering contextual details
may involve a large distortion (e.g., misremembering the city in
which something occurred) or a very small one (e.g., misremem-
bering which side of the sofa you were sitting on). Importantly,
however, any deviation from the original representation is likely
to correspond to a deviation from the initial neural representation
of that memory trace. Even if a given retrieval event produces a
memory trace that highly overlaps with the original memory, any
amount of difference may be sufficient to induce competition.
Figure 3A is another demonstration of the change in contex-
tual details over time that is predicted by CTT. Recent memo-
ries are high in accurate details, low in semantic content (which
has not yet been consolidated), and low in inaccurate details, as
the hippocampus has not yet had an opportunity to distort the
memory owing to only a few replay/reactivation events. Remote
memories, on the other hand, are low in accurate details, high
in semantic content (which is now consolidated in the neocor-
tex), and high in inaccurate details, as the hippocampus has
had ample opportunity to distort the memory across numerous
replay/reactivation events. The decline in accuracy of the memory
follows the typical forgetting curve of Ebbinghaus (1885).
The increase in semantic strength is assumed to be monotonic
and linear, although it is quite possible that it follows the same
curvilinear pattern. Replay studies repeatedly demonstrate reac-
tivation events in the short term (minutes, hours), with very few
on the order of days (reviewed in Sutherland et al., 2010). Thus
it is possible that most events leading to consolidation occur in
the short term and the memory asymptotes quickly. However, in
the absence of robust data for remote replay (exceeding several
days), the exact pattern is difficult to infer. Importantly, CTT only
makes assumptions about the slopes of these curves relative to one
another and not about the exact shape of any particular curve.
To summarize, below are the central tenets of CTT:
1. Every time a memory is reactivated, the hippocampus recon-
textualizes the memory by re-encoding a similar but not iden-
tical memory trace that is stored using associative connectivity
between the hippocampus and neocortex.
2. Memories are decontextualized over time by competitive inter-
ference among these similar but not identical multiple memory
traces. This simultaneously leads to consolidation of semantic
memory in the neocortex and loss of episodic details.
3. Veridical episodic details are only available in very recent mem-
ories. As memories get older, these details are replaced by
recontextualized details stored by the hippocampus that give
rise to illusory memories that become more prevalent as the
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FIGURE 3 | Illusory details build up as memories get older. (A) A
conceptual representation of how information content changes as a function
of the age of the memory. Semantic content increases with consolidation,
while true contextual details are replaced by illusory details; (B) An empirical
demonstration of how illusory details increase as a function of time. See text
for discussion. Data plotted based on values from Schmolck et al. (2000).
age of the memory increases. In other words, recent episodic
and remote episodic memories vary in accuracy of details and
strength of semantic content.
HARMONIZING CTT WITH PRE-EXISTING IDEAS
As we previously mentioned, CTT borrows elements from many
existing theories and models. It is largely consistent with indexing
theory (Teyler and DiScenna, 1986) and stresses the role of the hip-
pocampus in encoding and binding the initial memory traces, and
acting as an index during retrieval. Much like the CLS (McClelland
et al., 1995) framework, CTT also assumes that the reactivation of
hippocampal-neocortical traces strengthens the cortico-cortical
traces leading to consolidation of memories. On the other hand,
CTT also assumes that each reactivation of the memory results in
a new trace and not just the reactivation of the old trace, which is
consistent with MTT. Also consistent with the MTT proposal is the
notion that the hippocampus is involved in the “reconstruction”
rather than the “retrieval” of the memory. Nadel and Moscov-
itch (1998) also propose that reactivation of neocortical traces
strengthens the links among multiple traces, which is the basis for
building knowledge. This is further in agreement with CTT, how-
ever, we also suggest that the non-overlapping components of the
traces compete with one another resulting in decontextualization
in addition to consolidation.
We propose that the new hippocampal-neocortical traces
formed are always partially but not completely overlapping with
the original trace, resulting in competition for representation in
the neocortex (this competition does not occur in the hippocam-
pus due to pattern separation mechanisms discussed in detail
below), leading to a selective strengthening of semantic infor-
mation and weakening of contextual information. Thus, under
CTT, the role of the hippocampus during retrieval is hypothe-
sized to be the recontextualization of memories during retrieval
to generate new competing traces. On the face of it, this may
seem to be counterproductive at the level of the neocortex. As
we will discuss below, we believe that this arises as a function of
pattern separation computations necessary for episodic encoding.
However, inducing competition may have a particular benefit in
maintaining and retrieving memory traces. Namely, degradation
of competing elements of a memory trace ensures that the impor-
tant central features of that memory are not only preserved, but
also strengthened.
The role of the hippocampus in recontextualization is also
closely related to its role in mental imagery and imagining the
future. Hassabis et al. (2007) demonstrated that this ability is
impaired in hippocampal amnesic patients. They surmised that the
hippocampus may contribute to the creation of new experiences
by allowing disparate elements of prior memories to be bound in a
spatial context. Addis and Schacter (2011) further extend this in a
recent review of patient and neuroimaging findings to suggest that
the hippocampus is also necessary for imagining the future and
“episodic simulation.” These roles in imagery are consistent with
the notion of hippocampal recontextualization that we propose
herein.
Our view is also largely consistent with the Distributed Rein-
statement Theory of Sutherland et al. (2010) in which it is the
frequency of replay/re-encoding episodes rather than the passage
of time that leads to memories becoming independent of the
hippocampus. Indeed, the central tenet of CTT is that reactiva-
tion events occurring as the age of the memory increases are the
critical event in consolidation. While “age of memory” is plot-
ted along the abscissa in the illustrations, it is used merely as a
proxy that makes measurement feasible. Quantifying the number
of reactivations, which is likely non-linear, is much less feasible.
While one can pit these two alternatives (age of memory vs. num-
ber of reactivations) against each other in an experimental setup,
only cued, not spontaneous, reactivation events can be assessed
easily.
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One potential possibility using advanced optogenetics tech-
niques is to allow the hippocampus to engage in initial learning
which could label the neurons involved using an immediate-early
gene (e.g., Liu et al., 2012), then quantify reactivation events occur-
ring within the labeled population only. Better yet, by silencing
these neurons during specific time epochs, only circumscribed
reactivations could be allowed. Thus, the effect of the passage of
time vs. number of reactivations can be assessed directly.
The notion of competition for representation is not unique to
memory by any means, and in fact seems to be a general princi-
ple of cortical operation. For example, it generally believed that in
order for objects in the visual field to capture attention and be sub-
jected to further neural processing they compete with one another
for representation. Bottom-up and top-down influences can bias
this competition by assigning priority to certain features or items
but not others (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). A similar argument
has been extended to the role of arousal in increasing the con-
trast between important and unimportant details in mnemonic
representation (Mather and Sutherland, 2011). Thus, competition
among memory traces (in contrast to competition among mem-
ory systems, which is widely accepted) is not an implausible idea,
and in fact could be supported by very similar mechanisms to
competition in other domains.
We further propose that the mechanisms involved in this com-
petition arise as a result of hippocampal-neocortical dynamics and
are particularly dependent on hippocampal processing. This har-
monizes the model with the hippocampus’s role in minimizing
interference (i.e., pattern separation), a central tenet of the CLS.
Below, we discuss this function in detail and suggest a potential
mechanism by which it can facilitate cortical interference whilst
minimizing hippocampal interference.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF PATTERN SEPARATION AND PATTERN
COMPLETION
The hippocampus is capable of supporting rapid encoding of
unique experiences by orthogonalizing incoming inputs such that
interference is minimized, a function termed pattern separation,
which is typically ascribed to the hippocampal dentate gyrus (DG)
(Marr, 1971; Treves and Rolls, 1994; McClelland et al., 1995;
O’Reilly and Norman, 2002; Norman and O’Reilly, 2003; Yassa
and Stark, 2011). The hippocampus also has a well-recognized
role in the formation of arbitrary associations using its recur-
rent collateral network in the CA3 subregion, a function termed
pattern completion (Rolls, 2007). Recent evidence from animals
(Nakazawa et al., 2003; Guzowski et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2004; Leut-
geb et al., 2004, 2005, 2007; Vazdarjanova and Guzowski, 2004;
Gold and Kesner, 2005; Kesner, 2007; McHugh et al., 2007) and
humans (Bakker et al., 2008; Lacy et al., 2011) has provided strong
support for the involvement of the hippocampus in these two
important mnemonic computations. Though there is still some
debate as to the precise nature of episodic memory, most in the
field regard its core components as consisting of autobiographi-
cal details such as what occurred in addition to where and when.
The capacity to orthogonalize overlapping input to create distinct
memory traces, or to reinstate a particular memory trace based on
partial or degraded input, are critical for encoding and remember-
ing such details (Norman and O’Reilly, 2003; Norman, 2010). We
suggest that pattern separation and pattern completion, provided
they occur across different dimensions including space and time,
are together necessary and sufficient to give rise to our episodic
memory system with all of its richness, associativity, and flexibility
(Yassa and Stark, 2011).
Given this deeper understanding of episodic memory mecha-
nisms, it is important to discuss how the proposed CTT framework
fits with these computations. First, let us make the case for pattern
completion. This ability requires the reactivation of a previously
stored representation when presented with a partial or a degraded
cue. It is hypothesized to be a specific function of the CA3 region of
the hippocampus due to recurrent collateral connectivity, which
forms an autoassociative network and its innervation from the
neocortex via the perforant path. This rapid retrieval is also bal-
anced against new encoding in the CA3 region, which is subject to
strong input by mossy fiber innervation from the DG granule cells
(a pattern separation signal) (Treves and Rolls, 1994). Thus, the
CA3 region regulates the dynamic balance between pattern sep-
aration and pattern completion at least in the spatial domain. A
similar role may exist for the CA1 region in temporal pattern sep-
aration and completion, though there is less existing data on this
phenomenon (see Hunsaker and Kesner, 2013 for a comprehensive
recent review).
We suggest that pattern completion in the hippocampus reac-
tivates the neocortical trace and leads to a strengthening of the
overlapping trace over time. A pattern completion mechanism
is necessary for CTT and could in theory underlie the ability to
strengthen representations over time in a Hebbian fashion (using a
slow cortical dynamic). The decay in non-overlapping features of
the memory due to competitive interference is likewise presumed
to occur in anti-Hebbian fashion.
Next, we turn to pattern separation. An important tenet of
CTT is that every time a memory is reactivated, re-encoding of
the trace occurs. This re-encoding contains some of the reacti-
vated features (the attractor state), in addition to some unique
associations that attempt to orthogonalize, though incompletely,
the current representation from past memories. According to CTT,
pattern separation in the hippocampus (in particular, the DG) is
the most important factor in re-encoding a slightly different ver-
sion of the experience (i.e. recontextualization), which causes the
subsequent competition among overlapping traces in the neocor-
tex. This can be viewed as a side effect of an otherwise very adaptive
process, which acts to minimize interference in the initial storage
of information, but leads to competitive interference in the cortex
over time as previous memories are reactivated. This is a much
more dynamic view of pattern separation and attempts to exam-
ine its long-term not just short term effects. It is important to note
that this type of interference is unlike the catastrophic interfer-
ence that would occur if sequential learning occurred too rapidly.
Cortical interference is much slower and thus is much more stable
in terms of network dynamics. Given the above, CTT is not only
consistent with the pattern separation/completion framework but
in fact relies on these computations to formulate its predictions.
HARMONIZING CTT WITH EXISTING DATA
Competitive trace theory is generally consistent with, and offers
explanations for, much of the existing episodic memory literature
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across species. While discussing every bit of evidence in the field
is beyond the scope of this article, we present the case here using
specific representative examples from behavioral studies of false
memory and neuropsychological studies of amnesia in animals
and humans.
BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF FALSE MEMORY
To see the extent to which memory is non-veridical and is sub-
ject to constant updating, one need not look any further than
the pioneering work of Bartlett (1932). Using the method of ser-
ial reproductions with material ranging from abstract drawings
to stories such as “War of the Ghosts,” Bartlett illustrated beauti-
fully how memory can be altered every time it is retrieved. While
this insightful work taught us about the impact of social bias on
remembering, it also demonstrated unequivocally that memory is
not veridical and is subject to constant change and reconstruc-
tion. Since Bartlett, research in false memory has enjoyed a rich
tradition. Loftus (2005) has been investigating how humans adopt
misinformation for over 30 years providing much of what we
know about how false memories can be formed and how they
can be extraordinarily rich in complexity and detail. False recall
is also easily demonstrated by memory tasks such as the Deese–
Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger
and McDermott, 1995), and mnemonic discrimination tasks with
similar lures (Yassa et al., 2011). Schacter discusses these memory
“sins” as features of an adaptive memory system (Schacter, 1999).
The frequency and abundance of these phenomena are consistent
with the premise of recontextualization in CTT and suggest that
reactivations lead to reconstructions of and updates to the initial
memory.
Aside from the mere existence of false memory, for which there
is extensive evidence within our field, CTT further proposes that
the probability by which false memories are created are increased
with repeated reactivations. Since reactivations are difficult to
assess directly in humans unless they are induced using a cue-
ing procedure, one can use the age of the memory as a proxy. We
predict that the more time passing since initial encoding would
be associated with increased tendency for false memories or dis-
tortions. In other words, the number of veridical details reported
would decline with the age of the memory, while the number of
illusory details would increase. There are many demonstrations of
this effect, but we will discuss just two examples here.
The first example comes from a study by Schmolck et al. (2000)
where college students were asked to recall the circumstances sur-
rounding hearing about the verdict in the O. J. Simpson double
murder trial after 3 days and were re-tested on their memories 15
or 32 months later. They found that as a function of a longer reten-
tion interval, the frequency of memory distortions increased (at
32 months, more than 40% of the recollections contained major
distortions and only 29% were highly accurate). These results are
shown in Figure 3B.
The second example comes from flashbulb memories. Brown
and Kulik first described the flashbulb memory in 1977 as a vividly
detailed memory of the circumstances surrounding an important
emotional event, such as the assassination of John F. Kennedy
(Brown and Kulik, 1977). Neisser (1982) wrote of his own flash-
bulb memory of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on Sunday,
December 7th, 1941. He recalled that he was listening to a base-
ball game on the radio. Many years later, it occurred to him that
no baseball games are played in December (it was later suggested
that it was actually a football game). It is now well accepted that
although flashbulb memories are high in vividness, accuracy in
many cases is low. A more recent study by Talarico and Rubin
(2003) suggested that confidence in flashbulb memories increases
while accuracy decreases over time. The investigators tested college
students on their memory of first hearing about the September
11th terrorist attacks the day after the events occurred. Repeat
testing occurred at 1, 6, or 32 weeks later. They found that the
decline in accuracy for flashbulb memories was no different than
everyday memories, however ratings of vividness and confidence
did not decline for flashbulb memories. This report is also consis-
tent with CTT’s predictions, as the inclusion of fictitious details
over time may give the illusion of accuracy and thus, recollection
confidence (i.e., metamemory) remains high.
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF HUMAN AMNESIA
While it is commonly agreed upon that cases of human amnesia
suggest that remote retrograde memory is relatively intact, there is
less agreement about whether the intact memories are rich enough
in contextual detail to be deemed episodic or whether the recalled
memories are more semantic in nature. SMSC asserts that those
memories are truly episodic as they have become consolidated
and become independent of the hippocampus long before hip-
pocampal damage occurred. MTT, on the other hand, asserts that
these memories are not entirely episodic because the hippocampus
continues to be required for remote episodic memory recall.
As previously mentioned, Corkin characterized H. M.’s mem-
ories as “semanticized” or lacking in episodic detail, which is
consistent with MTT. Other amnesia cases have demonstrated
similar deficits in remote memories (Hirano and Noguchi, 1998;
Moscovitch et al., 2000; Cipolotti et al., 2001). However, work
by Squire and colleagues has strongly suggested that with more
detailed neuropsychological investigations, the quality of retrieved
remote memories in amnesia is similar to controls (Bayley et al.,
2003; Kirwan et al., 2008). Squire and colleagues argue that the
impairment in remote memory found in some cases of amne-
sia is secondary to non-MTL damage. In the absence of detailed
neuroanatomical quantification, it is difficult to know whether
this is truly the case. Another potential confound is the absence
of corroboration to ensure the veracity of these memories (e.g.,
informant or diaries) in most if not all cases. Thus, it is not known
whether the details retrieved are accurate or fictitious.
While the literature on remote memory in human amnesia is
subject to much debate with respect to the episodic nature of such
memories, CTT’s predictions have much to do with the veracity
of these memories. Similar to MTT, it hypothesizes that the hip-
pocampus continues to be important for remote memories, but
for entirely different reasons. During recall of remote memories,
the hippocampus recontextualizes or updates the memory. In its
absence, a strong personal semantic memory is available in the cor-
tex and can be accessed directly. It is important to note here that
MTT proposes that retrieval is dependent on the hippocampus
because the hippocampus is required to reconstruct the memory
of the episode within a spatial scaffold (Nadel and Moscovitch,
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1998), thus a non-hippocampal memory would lack spatial con-
text. CTT, on the other hand, proposes that any context (spatial or
otherwise) can additionally be consolidated and strengthened to
become independent of the hippocampus, as long as it is over-
lapping and not interfering with prior exposures. The critical
difference between the two models is the explicit role assigned
for overlap and interference in CTT.
Whether this personal semantic memory has associated con-
textual detail is not a categorical distinction but rather depends on
the position of this memory on the contextualization continuum
previously discussed. Thus, some memories may have more con-
textual details than others. The counterintuitive prediction of CTT
here, however, is that amnesic patients will have remote memories
that are more accurate than healthy controls, since the absence of
a hippocampus prevents the recontextualization and reconstruc-
tion of those memories. While the data supporting this account
are only circumstantial, autobiographical memory reports from
patients like E. P. do suggest that autobiographical memories were
less likely to be embellished or changed despite repeated recall in
amnesia (Bayley et al., 2003).
Overall, the data from human amnesia cannot be used as strong
support for CTT or any other model for recent vs. remote memory,
given the disagreements about the (1) quality (e.g., richness, vivid-
ness, etc.) of the memories retrieved, (2) quantity of the memories
retrieved, (3) accuracy of the memories retrieved, and (4) neu-
roanatomical characterization of medial temporal lobe damage. It
is our hope, however, that the additional predictions afforded by
CTT provide a platform for future studies with amnesic patients
that may support or refute some of these basic ideas.
RODENT MODELS OF RETROGRADE AMNESIA
Most investigations of RA in the rodent hippocampus have been
conducted using contextual fear conditioning. While several early
examinations of recent vs. remote memories reported a tempo-
ral RA gradient (Kim and Fanselow, 1992; Maren et al., 1997;
Anagnostaras et al., 1999), other studies have reported flat RA
gradients (Lehmann et al., 2007; Sutherland et al., 2008). Investi-
gations of RA in hippocampus lesioned rats in spatial navigation
tasks have also reported generally flat RA gradients (Sutherland
et al., 2001; Clark et al., 2005a,b; Martin et al., 2005). CTT pre-
dicts that the extent to which the hippocampus is critical for
remote retrieval (i.e., whether there is a temporal or flat RA
gradient) depends on (1) how much reactivation has occurred
since the initial learning and (2) the nature of the retrieval task
and whether it requires hippocampal recontextualization. The
latter point is one deserving of further analysis. The ability of
the hippocampus to engage in recontextualization should be a
function of all of the other experiences it has encoded (these
are the sources of interfering traces that can compete with the
memory with each reactivation), thus factors such as rearing in
rich vs. impoverished environments can significantly influence the
results.
This is evidenced by phenomena such as immediate shock
deficit (ISD: Fanselow, 1986) and the context pre-exposure effect
(Fanselow, 1990), where a critical role of the hippocampus in
learning about the environment in contextual fear conditioning is
demonstrated. It is likely that the parameters of these phenomena
(e.g., latency required for ISD or pre-exposure) are dependent on
the animal’s prior history. Most studies with rodents use indi-
vidually housed rats in impoverished conditions, which results
in the hippocampus operating under suboptimal conditions. We
suggest that the hippocampus’ ability to facilitate cortical interfer-
ence by encoding recontextualized versions of the memories will
depend on this prior history. In light of this, a re-examination of
lesion studies in rodents and future studies using animals reared
in enriched environments are required to fully test the predictions
of CTT.
Several studies have shown that hippocampal learning can com-
pete with learning in non-hippocampal systems (Maren et al.,
1997; Frankland et al., 1998; Driscoll et al., 2005; Lehmann et al.,
2006; Sutherland et al., 2006; Wiltgen et al., 2006), suggesting that
different memory traces do compete for representational resources
in the brain. In a recent demonstration, Sutherland and col-
leagues (Sparks et al., 2011) showed that a non-hippocampally
acquired contextual fear memory (learned while hippocampus
was temporarily inactivated) was susceptible to interference or
competition from the hippocampus when it was subsequently
reactivated. These findings are directly predicted by CTT and fur-
ther demonstrate the impact of competition among hippocampal-
neocortical memory traces. These data also offer an alternative
account to demonstrations of anterograde amnesia following
pre-training hippocampal inactivation (e.g., Bast et al., 2001).
While it is possible that the inactivation prevented the animals
from learning the task, another possibility is that the reactiva-
tion of the hippocampus after learning disrupted performance on
test due to competition with memory traces formed outside the
hippocampus.
The above data suggest that there is indeed interference and
competition between hippocampal and neocortical memories.
The CTT formalizes this competition and describes a potential
mechanism (via hippocampal pattern separation) by which it can
occur.
MEMORY UPDATING AND RECONSOLIDATION
It has been long known that retrieved memories are labile and can
be disrupted. For example, Donald Lewis’s seminal experiments in
1968 demonstrated that reactivated memories can be disrupted by
electroconvulsive shock (Misanin et al., 1968). Based on this work,
Lewis proposed that reactivating a memory brings it into an active
state that is vulnerable to disruption by external agents (Lewis,
1979). In 2000, Nader et al. (2000a) demonstrated that a protein
synthesis inhibitor (anisomycin) resulted in the disruption of a
reactivated fear memory. The authors proposed a mechanism for
this disruption they termed “reconsolidation,” which essentially
posits that reactivation results into two distinct events: an unbind-
ing of the synapses representing the memory and a concurrent
second round of protein synthesis to re-instantiate the memory.
Protein synthesis inhibitors, they surmised, blocked the second
event, thus disrupting the memory permanently (Nader et al.,
2000b). Although initial reports were inconsistent across laborato-
ries [e.g., memory loss was not always permanent (see Power et al.,
2006)] and the widespread effects of protein synthesis inhibitors
were seen as potential confounds (Rudy et al., 2006), more recent
data has partly supported the notion that reconsolidation may
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 107 | 9
Yassa and Reagh Hippocampal competitive trace theory
occur under some conditions and may be at least one way in which
memory updating can occur (Besnard et al., 2012).
Conceptually, CTT is consistent with both Lewis’s Active Trace
Theory and reconsolidation theory in that it puts great emphasis
on memory reactivation as the critical event by which a memory
can be updated. We also similarly suggest that intervening with
the memory trace during retrieval can disrupt it. However, the
exact mechanisms diverge. CTT’s account is based on interference
among competing memory traces and not a synaptic “resetting”
per se. The extent to which spontaneous recovery can be observed
(as in extinction procedures) will depend on the extent of the inter-
ference among the competing traces. If the competition results
in suppression of much of the original memory, spontaneous
recovery may not be observed.
More directly relevant to CTT, Monfils et al. (2009) recently
suggested that preceding an extinction procedure with a single
reactivation trial can disrupt fear memory. The same procedure has
recently been applied to disrupt fear memories in humans (Schiller
et al., 2010) and decrease cue-induced craving in human heroin
users (Xue et al., 2012). While the results of this type of mem-
ory disruption have been interpreted in terms of reconsolidation,
they do not necessarily speak to the underlying mechanism. We
argue that results from retrieval-extinction procedures are more
consistent with the CTT account, where retrieval is associated with
a re-encoding of the memory, which only partially overlaps with
the original memory and can compete with it for storage. In the
retrieval-extinction procedure this process is greatly accelerated by
providing the competing memory directly in the extinction trials.
It is likely that this update process happens all the time, how-
ever, there is typically no systematic attempt to extinguish behavior
with competing memories in every day circumstances. This results
in a subtle update that removes some features of the memory and
adds others. In an experimental setting, however, where a compet-
ing memory is explicitly encoded to extinguish the fear behavior, it
is much easier to observe a complete or near-complete ablation of
the memory. Episodic memories in humans are also likely much
richer than fear memories in animals thus a complete ablation
would be more difficult to instantiate as the competition needs to
occur repeatedly and over an extended period of time.
MAKING NEW PREDICTIONS BASED ON CTT
The CTT framework represents a plausible mechanism by which
hippocampal-neocortical traces are established and updated. It
makes a set of empirical predictions that can be tested directly in
animals or humans. We highlight some of these predictions here,
in hopes that they will be instigate such research in the future to
attempt to support or refute CTT’s core premises.
• The first prediction is the remote episodic memories should be
less accurate than recent episodic memories. We discussed some
evidence for this in studies of false memory as well as human
amnesia, however the prediction needs to be tested more directly
using veridical records of information. This prediction may also
be tested using an animal model where the accuracy of the mem-
ory can be tested using a discrimination/generalization proce-
dure. For example, Wiltgen and Silva (2007) provide supporting
evidence for this by demonstrating that context generalization
increases as a function of time, consistent with our proposal that
more remote memories are less context-specific.
• The second prediction is that amnesia patients as well as rodents
with hippocampal lesions should have more accurate remote
semantic memories compared to healthy controls. This follows
from the premise that having a hippocampus has the capacity to
distort the memory every time it is recalled. Removing this brain
region should also remove the capacity for distortion, leaving an
intact semantic memory without associated illusory details.
• The third prediction is that whether a flat or graded RA curve
is observed in rodent studies will depend on whether contextual
information was repeatedly presented to the animal. If contex-
tual information was presented more than once, some amount
of this context will become semanticized, and thus hippocampal
damage will lead to a flat RA gradient. However, if contextual
information was presented only once, there isn’t an opportunity
for semantic information to build up, and hippocampus damage
will lead to a graded RA. Controlled experiments with amnesic
patients or lesioned animals can test this prediction. It is inter-
esting to note here that flat or graded RA curves can be obtained
also with cortical lesions. Cho and Kesner (1996) showed that a
flat RA gradient could be obtained with parietal cortical lesions
while a temporally graded RA could be obtained with entorhi-
nal cortical lesions in a spatial discrimination task. Thus, the
location of the lesion, as well as the degree of contextual repe-
tition are both hypothesized to influence the temporal gradient
of RA.
• The fourth prediction is that the fidelity of mnemonic rep-
resentations should change with repeated reactivations in the
hippocampus and the neocortex. The degree of overlap in repre-
sentations from exposure to exposure should predict how strong
the memory is in a subsequent test (i.e., should generate a gener-
alizable representation), while the degree of stochasticity should
predict how contextual the memory is. Furthermore, given the
hippocampus’ powerful capacity for orthogonalizing inputs, it
may be the case that repetitions of identical study items may
nonetheless induce competition as a result of varying exter-
nal and internal contextual elements. This prediction can be
tested using multivariate pattern classification techniques such
as representational similarity analyses (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008)
applied to fMRI or neurophysiological recording data.
• The fifth prediction is that there will be evidence for interfer-
ence in the neocortex and not just the hippocampus, however,
the timescale for neocortical trace interference will be much
slower than the hippocampus and the mechanism will be more
dependent on competitive inhibition via LTD-like mechanisms
rather than pattern separation. This prediction may prove espe-
cially difficult to assess, though neurophysiological recordings
and gene expression assays in animal models, or post-exposure
representational similarity analyses via fMRI in humans may
provide some insight. It is important to note here that LTD
mechanisms are not hypothesized to be limited to the neocortex
or to competitive inhibition per se. There is strong evidence that
these mechanisms are also necessary for the acquisition of new
memories in the hippocampus (Kemp and Manahan-Vaughan,
2004). Thus, this is likely a much more general mechanism,
which could serve several purposes for our memory system.
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CONCLUSION
The role of the hippocampus in retrieval has been subject to much
debate. The two schools of thought on the topic, SMSC and MTT,
have had divergent predictions and so far, it is still not clear which
model best describes the empirical data. We propose an alterna-
tive model in the form of a continuum and hypothesize that the
role of the hippocampus during retrieval is recontextualization of
memories along this continuum. This process, in turn, facilitates
competition and trace interference in the cortex such that that con-
solidated memory traces become semantic. Our model explains
much of the current data and provides fodder for future research in
the form of testable empirical predictions. It may prove helpful as
we shift our focus from categorical assignments such as “episodic”
and move toward a more computationally grounded, cross-species
compatible, continuum approach to declarative memory.
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